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Power indices are used for evaluating the voters’ influence on group decision making. The
Shapley-Shubik index, defined by Shapley and Shubik [1954], is one of the most well-
known. It has been applied to many voting systems and it has been proved to be useful
in evaluating the voters’ power. See Lucas [1983] and Straffin [1994]. The nonsymmetric
generalization of the Shapley-Shubik index. was developed by Owen [1971], an. $\mathrm{d}$ it was
modified later by Shapley [1977]. Today, it is called the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen
index. See also Owen and Shapley [1989]. The basic premise of this index is that coalition
formation depends on the voters’ ideological similarities.
Regretfully, the number of applications of the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index is
small. Although this index assumes voters are not symmetric, it assumes, at the same
time, bills arise everywhere and at random. Previous studies have since modified the
model in their own way to deal with this nonsymmetry of bills. For example, they have
used the factor analysis in common to show the voters’ differences. That is, they have fol-
lowed Shapley’s modification. See Frank and Shapley [1981], Rapoport and Golan [1985],
Rabinowitz and Macdonald [1986], and Ono and Muto [1995].
In this paper, we will focus on another assumption of the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen
index, the unboundedness of the profile space. We will analyze the same voting situation
as in Ono and Muto [1995], the House of Councilors in Japan during 1989-1992; but we
will use the quantification method III to position the voters and bills in the ideological
space, folowing Owen’s nonsymmetric generalization.
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2The Shapley-Shubik Index and Its Nonsymmetric
Generalization
Let $N=\{1,2, \cdots, n\}$ be the set of voters and let $v$ : $2^{N}arrow R$ with $v(\emptyset)=0$ be a
characteristic function, where $2^{N}$ is the set of all subsets (coalitions) $S\subseteq N$ and $R$ is the
set of real numbers. To deal with voting situations, the following assumptions are made:
1. $\forall S\subseteq N$ : $v(S)\in\{0,1\}$ .
2. $v(N)=1$ .
3. (Monotonicity) $\forall S,$ $T\subseteq N:(S\subset T\Rightarrow v(S)\leq v(T))$ .
4. (Properness) $\forall S\subset N$ : $v(S)+v(N\backslash S)\leq 1$ , where $N\backslash S$ is the complement of $S$
with respect to $N$ .
The first assumption means $v$ takes only the values 1 and $0$ . If the members in $S$ can
pass the bill regardless of the others’ votes, we define $v(S)=1$ ; otherwise, $v(S)=$
$0$ . Sets $S$ with $v(S)=1$ are called winning coalitions, and sets with $v(S)=0$ losing
coalitions. The set of all winning coalitions and of all losing coalitions are denoted by $\mathcal{W}$
and $\mathcal{L}$ , respectively. And secondly, grand coalition $N$ is assumed to always be winning.
Monotonicity Assumption means that sets including a winning coalition are winning, while
sets included in a losing coalition are losing. Finally, Properness Assumption excludes the
case where two or more disjoint coalitions are winning. The games with the preceding
assumptions are called voting games.
We next define a special class of voting games called weighted majority games. Let
$w_{i}>0$ be the weight of voter $i\in N$ , or the number of his votes. All the members in $N$
vote either yea or nay. The issue passes if the number of yea-votes is more than or equal
to the quota $q$ , where $\frac{1}{2}\Sigma_{\in N}.w_{i}<q\leq\Sigma_{i\in N}w_{i}$ . The characterisic function $v$ is given as
$v(S)=\{$
1 if $\Sigma_{i\in s^{w}:}\geq q$ ,
$0$ if $\Sigma_{i\in^{s}}w_{i}<q$ .
For simplicity, we denote this game by $[q;w_{1,n}\ldots, w]$ .
Suppose voters join a coalition one after another and eventually form the grand coali-
tion. Then there exists a unique voter,called a pivot, who joins and thereby turns a losing
coalition into a winning one.
Definition 2.1 Take an ordering of $n$ voters and voter $i\in N$ . Let $S$ be the set of voters
preceding $i$ . Then voter $i$ is calfed a pivot for the ordering if $v(S\cup\{i\})=1$ and $v(S)=0$ .
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Each of the $n!$ orderings of $n$ voters has a unique pivot. The Shapley-Shubik index of a
voter is the probability of his being a pivot when every ordering is equally probable1.
Definition 2.2 The Shapfey-Shubik index of a voting game $(N, v)$ is the $n$ -vector $\varphi(v)=$
$(\varphi_{1}(v), \cdots, \varphi n(v))$ where
$\varphi_{i}(v)=\sum_{\in S\epsilon \mathcal{L},S\cup \mathrm{t}i\}w}\frac{s!(n-s-1)!}{n!}$ , $i=1,$ $\cdots,$ $n$ . (1)
Here $s$ is the number of members in $S$ .
The Shapley-Shubik index assumes that all orderings are formed with equal probabil-
ity. But, in political voting situations, some orderings would be more probable than the
others. For instance, take voters 1, 2 and 3, a liberalist, a centrist and a conservative,
respectively. Since the extreme voters 1 and 3 are opposed to each other, ordering 132 is
less likely to be formed than 123 or 321. Here ordering $ijk$ implies that $i$ is the first to
join, $j$ is the second and $k$ is the last, i.e., the coalition is formed in the order of $i,$ $j,$ $k$ .
To take the nonsymmetry of voters into account, Owen [1971] introduced an ideology
profile space. It is a multidimensional real space, and each dimension corresponds to a
particular ideology. For example, right versus left, conservative versus progressive, and
so on. Every voter is placed in this space depending on his ideological position. Each
proposed bill has ideologies as well, and is placed in the space. If a bill is proposed, voters
whose ideological positions are close to the bill would enthusiastically support it. Owen
thus supposed that voters form a coalition according to their Euclidean distances from the
proposed bill. More precisely, for each bill, the closest voter joins first, the second-closest
joins next, and so on. The most distant voter joins last. Owen further supposed that bills
appear at random in this ideology proffie space.
If there is only one ideological axis, say a left-right axis, then the three voters’ case
above can be depicted in terms of a line as in figure 1: for each $i=1,2,3,$ $X^{i}$ denotes voter
$i’ \mathrm{s}$ position. The space is divided into four regions $E_{1)}E_{2},$ $E_{3}$ and $E_{4}$ by the midpoints
of the line segments $x^{1}x^{2},$ $x^{13}X$ and $x^{2}x^{3}$ . For any bill in region $E_{1}$ , voter 1 is the closest,
2 is the next and 3 is the most distant; and thus the grand coalition is formed in the
order of 123. Similarly in regions $E_{2},$ $E_{3},$ $E_{4}$ , corresponding orderings are 213, 231, 321,
respectively. It is to be noted that regions $E_{2}$ and $E_{3}$ (producing orderings 213 and 231,
respectively) are bounded intervals; while regions $E_{1}$ and $E_{4}$ (producing orderings 123
and 321, respectively) are unbounded. This means that if bills (or issues) arise at random
1The Shapley-Shubik index is the wellknown Shapley value of voting games. This index is derived
















Figure 1: Three voters’ locations in a unidimensional profile space
in the whole real line, orderings 231 and 213 appear only in a negligibly few occasions;
and the other two orderings 123 and 321 appear with equal probability of 1/2. In the
simple majority case, voter 2 is pivotal in the both orderings; thus 2 has the whole power.
$*t$ denotes the ordering in each sector.
Figure 2: Three voters’ location in a two-dimensional profile space
More orderings may appear in a two-dimensional space. Figure 2 depicts the case
with three voters: each $x^{i}$ denotes voter $i’ \mathrm{s}$ position. Since there are three points, we
have three perpendicular bisectors of each pair of points. In this figure, the line $\ell_{j^{-}}\dot{.}\ell’\dot{.}j$
represents the perpendicular bisector of $x^{:}$ and $x^{j},$ $i,$ $j=1,2,3,$ $i\neq j$ . For example, bills
in the sector formed by half-lines $O\ell_{13}$ and $O\ell_{12}’$ produce ordering 312; because for any
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bill in the region voter 3 is the most enthusiastic supporter, voter 1 is the next, and 2 is
the least enthusiastic. Assuming issues appear at random in the whole two-dimensional
space, we obtain that the ordering 312 is produced with probability $\alpha/2\pi$ where a is the
angle formed by two lines $O\ell_{13}$ and $O\ell_{12}’$ . For each of the other regions, we can find in
a similar manner which ordering is produced and how it is probable: these orderings are
given in figure 2. Thus in the simple majority case where the second voter is always a
pivot, the nonsymmetric Shapley-Shubik index is
$( \frac{\alpha}{\pi}, \frac{\beta}{\pi}, \frac{\gamma}{\pi})$ .
In a space with more dimensions, the same results are obtained. For details, see Owen [1971].
Figure 3: Shapley’s construction of orderings
The Owen’s method requires a highly dimensional space; $(n-1)$-dimensions are nec-
essary for the case with $n$ voters; otherwise, it cannot determine the origin of the space.
Thus, this method is not very practical for cases with many voters. Shapley [1977] devel-
oped the following alternative method which enables us to find the nonsymmetric index
using a space with lesser dimensions. See also Owen and Shapley [1989]. Take an ideology
profile space with any dimension. Similarly to the Owen’s method, voters are represented
by points in the space. Issues are, however, represented not by points but by directed
arrows (or vectors) pass\’ing through the origin of the space. Now take two voters, $i$ and
$j$ , and an issue $\xi$ . Positions of the two voters are represented by points $x^{i}$ and $x^{j}$ . Drop
perpendiculars from $x^{i}$ and $x^{j}$ to $\xi$ ; and denote their foots by $x^{\prime:}$ and $x^{\prime j}$ . Shapley assumed
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voter $i$ prefers $\xi$ more than $j$ does, or $i$ precedes $j$ with respect to $\xi$ , if $||\mathit{0}_{X}^{arrow}\prime i||>||O\vec{x}^{\prime_{i}}||$
where $O$ is the origin of the space and $||O_{X||}^{\vee}\prime i$ (resp. $||O\vec{x}’j||$ ) is the signed distance along
the arrow $\xi$ between $O$ and $x^{\prime l}$ (resp. $x^{\prime j}$ ). The inequality means that voter $\mathrm{i}’ \mathrm{s}$ projection
to $\xi$ is greater; and thus the voter supports the issue more enthusiastically. In figure 3,
for $\mathrm{i}_{8\mathrm{S}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}}\epsilon/$ we have $||\mathit{0}_{X’}^{arrow}3||>||\mathit{0}_{x}^{\sim}\prime 1||>||\mathit{0}_{X^{\Omega}|}^{\sim}|$ ; thus ordering 312 is produced. Similarly
we obtain 132 for issue $\xi^{\prime/}$ . If we turn the arrow around the origin assuming issues arise at
random, we find for each ordering the sector in which it is produced. For each ordering,
the proportion of the corresponding angle to $2\pi$ gives the probability that the ordering
appears. We thus obtain the nonsymmetric index by finding out a pivotal voter in each
ordering. Note, that in the Shapley’s method, we may take the origin in an arbitrary po-
sition, where the same indices are obtained even if the origins are different. Thus, it can
define the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index in less than $(n-1)$-dimmensional space. It
should be also noted that Shapley’s method gives the Owen’s nonsymmetric index when
it is applied to the case with $(n-1)$-dimensional space ( $n$ is the number of voters); hence,
we may say that the Shapley’s device is a generalization of the Owen’s method. These two
facts are shown without much difficulty. The nonsymmetric index found by the Shapley’s
method is often called the Shapley-Owen index. For detailed comparison of these two
methods, see Ono-Muto(1995).
3 An Application: Power Distribution in the House
of Councilors
There have been many applications to evaluate voters’ power distribution using the sym-
metric Shapley-Shubik index; however, so far, only a few real cases have been studied
using the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index.
One theoretical drawback which makes applications difficult is the assumption of bills’
symmetry, $i.e.$ , that bills arise at random in the ideology profile space. Let us review some
studies using the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index, and see how they have modified the
index so as to include bills’ nonsymmetry.
The first study was the analysis of power distribution in the $\mathrm{U}.\mathrm{S}$ . Supreme Court by
Frank and Shapley [1981]. They used the factor anal.ysis to construct a profile space. In
the Court, it might be natural to assume the uniformity of the issues because issues are
given exogenously. Further, the profile space was adjusted so that the issues distributed
uniformly. Using the adjusted positions, they obtained the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen
index. It was a faithful application of the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index. They were
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able to analyze with only two- and three-dimensional spaces; the analysis with more than
four-dimensional space is virtually impossible.
Another study was the analysis of the $\mathrm{U}.\mathrm{S}$ . Presidential Election done by Rabinowitz
and Macdonald [1986]. They also used the factor analysis and constructed a $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{w}\infty \mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}$
profile space. But, they found the appearance of issues were not uniform. Thus, they
restricted the area to a sector in which most of the issues are included. Eventually, only
about a third of the area was considered, and uniformity assumption of issues was used
in this area. Here, the highly dimensional analysis still seemed to be difficult.
A case with more strongly biased issues was studied by Ono and Muto [1995]. It was
the analysis of the parties’ power in the House of Councilors in Japan. The profile space
was constructed by the factor analysis as well. The issue distribution was too biased;
thus, they used only observed issues instead. Since this distribution was discrete, they
can easily analyze with highly dimensional spaces.
It is noted that the factor analysis has so far been used to construct the profile spaces.
It means that each voter is considered as a point while each issue as a vector, or a direction.
It is similar to Shapley’s idea of constructing profile space. How would we interpret it
using Owen’s idea? In Owen’s idea, issues are also expressed as a point. However, inner
points such as those in $E_{2}$ and $E_{3}$ in figure 1 are ultimately ignored. But, these inner
points might be more probable because the issues are submitted by the members in the
congress. If the bills in $E_{2}$ and $E_{3}$ frequently arise, voter 1 and 3 will also have some
power in simple majority games. Thus, if it is necessary to consider issues’ nonsymmetry,
these inner points should be more emphasized than the outer ones. However, according
to Frank and Shapley or Rabinowitz and Macdonald, to exclude the outer region is not
very easy because the space is continuous. But, when we use only observed data, all we
have to do is calculate each issue’s position as a point.
The quantification method III is a method to position voters and issues so that their
similarity can be explained well in the sense of maximizing the correlation coefficient.
Further it assumes the data is binary just as our data is, although the factor analysis
assumes normaly distributed data which enables us to consider the distance between
each voter and each issue.
Now, we will evaluate the parties’ power in the House of Councilors in Japan dur-
ing the period 1989-1992, by using the quantification method III. In Japan, the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) had held a majority and thus a dictatorial position both in the
House of Representatives and in the House of Councilors for several decades up until 1989.
Hence the LDP had total power while the other parties were completely powerless both
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in terms of the symmetric Shapley-Shubik index and of the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen
index. But, in the election of July 1989, some opposing parties made remarkable progress
and the LDP lost their dictatorial power in the House of Councilors, though they were still
the largest party. We analyzed the parties’ power in the House of Councilors during that
period 1989-1992 using the data concerning parties’ “$\mathrm{y}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}/\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}$” patterns in nonunanimous
votes2. During this period, the Komeito (Komei), the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP),
and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) were similar in size. However, it has been often
said that the former two parties had much stronger power compared to the JCP, because
they are ideologically located between the LDP and the Social Democratic Party of Japan
(SDPJ). We will see if that fact has been proved true in terms of the power index.
There were more than ten parties and 15 independent members in July 1989 (just
after the election). The detailed data is shown in Ono and Muto [1995]. Though each
member of the House has the right to vote of his own free will, usually, members belonging
to the same party vote jointly. Thus, we formulate the voting system in the House as a
weighted majority game in which voters and weights are parties and the numbers of their
seats, respectively. In what follows, we have chosen the six largest parties to represent
voters to simplify the analysis. Some members in other mini parties and independents
are included in one of the six parties if they always follow the party’s decisions. Others
are eliminated from the game, but the quota of the game is still given as the number of
((
$\mathrm{y}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}$
” votes needed to win even if all the eliminated members vote (( $\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}$”. The weighted
majority game, based on the data of 1989, is given as follows:
quota $LDP$ SDPJ Komei $JCP$ $DSP$ Rengo
127; 109 74 21 14 10 12
The symmetric Shapley-Shubik index of this game is given as
$LDP$ SDPJ Komei $JCP$ $DSP$ Rengo
0.567 0.117 0.117 0.067 0.067 0.067.
It gives equal power to the JCP, the DSP, and the Rengo. We also give the nonsymmetric
Shapley-Owen indices with uniformly distributed bills for comparison:
dimension $LDP$ SDPJ Komei $JCP$ $DSP$ Rengo
1 $0$ 0.5 $0$ $0$ 0.5 $0$
2 0.248 0.139 0.136 0.046 0.431 $0$ .
See Frank and Shapley [1981] and Ono and Muto [1995] for the detailed way we obtain
these indices.
2In the House of Councilors, half the members are up for election every three years.
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Table 1: Pattern of $\mathrm{y}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}/\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}$ combinations (1989-1992)
Sources: Sangiin Kaigiroku [1989-1992]
Let us construct the profile space from the quantification method III. Using the data
of the six parties’ voting pattern given in table 1, we can obtain each voter’s profile point.
In the unidimensional profile space, parties position in the order of the LDP, the DSP,
the SDPJ, the Komei, the Rengo and the JCP, from the left. Each closed circle is the
profile of voters; each open one is of bills. Take a bill of type $\mathrm{A}$ ; then the closest voter for
it is the DSP, the second closest one is the SDPJ, and so on. After all, the ordering
$\mathrm{D}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{p}_{arrow}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{J}arrow \mathrm{K}_{0}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{i}arrow \mathrm{R}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{o}arrow \mathrm{L}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{p}arrow \mathrm{J}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{P}$
is formed. The pivot voter is the LDP. This type of issues can be interperted, for example,
that the LDP submits bills closer to four ideologically similar voters (the SDPJ, the Komei,
the DSP and the Rengo) so as to make the bills pass. Similarly, ordering for each of the
eight types of issues is obtained. Then the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index is
$LDP$ SDPJ Komei $JCP$ $DSP$ Rengo
0.714 0.241 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.000.
In the quantification method III, there is no convincing criterion which tells whether or
not the unidimensional space describes the real situation well. This method positions
voters and bills so as to maximize the correlation coefficient. The size of the correlation
coefficient could inform how well they are explained. In this case, the correlation coefficient
is 0.457. Thus, we should conclude unidimension is insufficient to explain.
Figure 4 is the two-dimensional profile space. The six closed circles describe parties’
positions, and the eight open ones describe bills’ position. In the same way as above, we
make an ordering according to parties’ distances from each bill. Then the nonsymmetric
Shapley-Owen index is
$LDP$ SDPJ Komei $JCP$ $DSP$ Rengo
0.759 0.000 0.241 0.000 0.000 0.000.
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Figure 4: Two-dimensional proffie space
In this figure, it is clear that these six parties are devided into 3 groups; the LDP, the
JCP, and the others. The parties positions in the last group is very alike and sensitive.
But, when we analyze with the unformity assumption of bills, their positions are very
important. In this analysis, for example, inside parties like the DSP and the Komei do
not have a chance to be the most enthusiastic supporter nor the most stubborn opponent.
If we take the bill of type $\mathrm{A}$ , however, the Komei is the most enthusiastic to this bill in
two-dimensional space. More than 60% of the bills are of this type. Nevertheless, the area
producing orderings beginning with the Komei has been ignored because it is bounded.
As discussed in Ono-Muto [1995], using only observed data makes the analysis with
more than three dimensions easy. As the number of dimension increases, there appear
two or more parties who have almost the same distance from an issue. For example, five
parties except the JCP have almost same distance from issues of type A. In this case,
we assume 5! orderings of the five parties arise with same probability. Then, from five
dimensional profile space, obtained index is
$($
$LDP$ SDPJ Komei $JCP$ $DSP$ Rengo
0.563 0.170 0.147 0.005 0.045 0.071.




In this paper, we analyzed the power distribution of House of Councilors in Japan using
the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index. Though the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index
has been applied to some cases, uniformity assumption of issues have required the profile
space to be modified. On the other hand, unboundedness of the profile space has not
been discussed. The unboundedness makes some issues unusable, even if they are very
important and frequently observed. In this paper, we used the distribution of observed
raw data as in Ono-Muto [1995]. But, using the quantification method III to construct
the profile space, we obtained the nonsymmetric Shapley-Owen index with the idea of
distance between an issue and a voter in Owen [1971]. If we use only observed data, it
is easy to increase the dimension of the profile space. Further, we found that the index
obtained from the quantification method III is very similar to the one obtained from the
factor analysis.
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